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Abstract
We explore the implications of an increase in clean technology spillovers between devel-
oped and developing countries. We build a game of abatements in which players are linked
with technology spillovers determined by an initial choice of absorptive capacities by devel-
oping countries. We show that, within a non-cooperative framework, the response of clean
technology investments in developed countries to an increase in cross-country technology
spillovers is ambiguous. If the marginal benefits of these additional abatements are not suf-
ficiently high, developed countries have a strategic incentive to decrease investments. Such
a strategic response jeopardizes the initial effects of an increase in technology spillovers on
climate change mitigation and decreases the incentives for developing countries to enhance
their absorptive capacities.
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1 Introduction
Fostering North-South climate-friendly technology diffusion requires developing countries to en-
hance their absorptive capacities. An important part of this effort is the result of international
agreements, the most important ones being financing mechanisms such as the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the new
Carbon Partnership Facility or the Clean Technology Fund. 1
Developing countries have indeed been reluctant to unilaterally bear the costs of these technol-
ogy transfers and therefore have conditioned their participation to climate change mitigation effort
upon receiving financial aid from developed countries. In the 2010 Cancun summit, developed
countries committed to jointly provide US$ 100 billion per year by 2020 to support the low-carbon
transition of developing countries (UNFCCC, 2010).2 The latest estimates of climate finance show
that the aggregate volume of public and private climate finance mobilized by developed countries
for developing countries reached US$ 61.8 billion in 2014, up from US$ 52.2 billion in 2013
(OECD, 2015). These financial resources are used to carry out projects in various sectors such
as energy, transports, biodiversity, agriculture and water protection. Importantly, these projects
encapsulate environmental technology diffusion as they include transfers of know-how, equipment
and organizational procedures that are invented in developed countries.3
In this paper, we provide an economic rationale for the financing of clean technology absorp-
tive capacities in developing countries by developed countries, beyond any historical considera-
tions suggesting that developed countries are responsible for global warming and therefore should
bear most of the costs of the mitigation. We show that an increase in developing countries absorp-
tive capacities may benefit more developed countries for two reasons. First, with larger absorptive
capacities, developing countries provide additional abatements on which developed countries free
ride. Second, absorptive capacities affect the incentives for developed countries to invest in clean
technology. In particular, higher absorptive capacities may deter investment. As a result, without
1These initiatives are often combined with more general policies in developing countries (Dechezleprêtre et al.,
2008). Changes in absorptive capacities can also be the consequence of changes in environmental regulation (Lanjouw
& Mody, 1996; Hilton, 2001; Gallagher, 2006). Other options are openness to trade, foreign direct investment and by
strengthening education and skills. See Dutz & Sharma (2012), Popp (2011), World Bank (2010), Dechezleprêtre et al.
(2011) and Dechezleprêtre et al. (2013) for discussions.
2This objective was reconfirmed in the Paris Agreement of COP 21 in December 2015.
3For instance, Popp (2011) discusses evidence on the transfers of climate friendly technologies through projects in
the framework of the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol.
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additional transfers developing countries may bear a larger part of the climate change mitigation
burden, and even lose from an increase in their absorptive capacities.
We build a 3-stage game in which a developed and a developing country are linked with
technology spillovers. We solve it by backward induction. In the last stage, countries non-
cooperatively choose their level of abatements. In the second stage, the developed country invests
in a technology that reduces the marginal costs of abatements of both countries. In the first stage,
the developing country chooses its absorptive capacities that determines the level of technology
spillovers between the two countries. A cooperative and a non-cooperative variant of this stage
are considered. We choose this timing in order to reflect the influence of technology spillovers
on investment in technology, in order to reflect actual negotiations on technology transfers. In
practice however, investment in technology and enhancements of absorptive capacities do not fol-
low a unique sequence. When choosing investment in technology, developed countries may also
anticipate future technology transfers. For this reason we also study an alternative timing in which
investment in technology happens before the enhancement of absorptive capacities.
We start by solving the last two stages of the game. We derive some comparative statics on the
impact of the level of spillovers on technology investment, abatements and payoffs. For a given
level of technology, an increase in technology spillovers leads to a reallocation of the abatement
effort from the developed to the developing country (a variant of the well-known carbon leakage
effect). We show that this effect is further exacerbated if the increase in spillovers leads to a
decrease in climate-friendly technology investments that the developed country makes in stage 2.
This occurs when the marginal benefits of abatements are steep. In particular, this could be the
case if there is a well-identified level of abatements around which a catastrophe is avoided, and if
the preferences for the public good are such that both countries expect the catastrophic event to be
avoided even with limited spillovers. Using these results, we solve the first stage of the game to
find the optimal level of absorptive capacities set by the developing country.
We then modify the fist stage to allow for the developed and the developing country to reach an
agreement in order to share the gains generated by an increase in a cooperatively chosen level of
technology spillovers. In this Nash bargaining process, we assume that both countries have equal
power over the negotiations. We show that the developing country may require monetary transfers
from the developed country above the cost of enhancing absorptive capacities in order to use clean
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technologies invented in the latter. As a benchmark, we also solve for the cooperative level of both
technology and absorptive capacities.
Both climate-friendly frontier innovations and resulting technology transfers are concentrated
in industrialized countries. However, technology diffusion from developed to developing countries
is non-negligible and could be scaled-up (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011). A sensible green growth
strategy for developing countries is more about catch-up innovations and diffusion of already-
existing technologies than frontier innovations (Dutz and Sharma, 2012).
In this paper, we consider that enhancing absorptive capacities in developing countries requires
a combination of specific policies targeted at the environment. Unlike other types of innovation,
environmentally friendly technologies suffer from two market failures that should in principle be
addressed with two sets of instruments (Jaffe et al., 2005; Popp, 2010). First, innovation policies
create incentives for the development of abatement technologies. These include R&D subsidies
and funding for research with a specific focus on the environment. Second, environmental regu-
lation ensures the adoption of these technologies by creating a market through the correction of
externalities related to pollution. For instance, this can be done relying on market-based instru-
ments such as carbon taxes or Emissions Trading Schemes.
In addition, the adoption of foreign technology can be increased via channels such as trade,
foreign direct investment, human capital investments or facilitating global connectivity through the
insertion of firms into the global value chain.4 Again, these policies can be specifically targeted at
the absorption of (foreign) clean technologies. For example, Dutz and Sharma (2012) argue that
the rapid development of wind energy capacities in China and India was made possible because of
licensing agreements with European manufacturers and international mobility of workers, which
allowed access to foreign technology.
Our paper relates to several strands of the economic literature. A series of papers have ad-
dressed how the presence of technology spillovers could affect the incentives to join a self-enforcing
International Environmental Agreement (IEA) (Barrett, 2006; Carraro et al., 2006; De Conink et
al., 2008; Hoel & de Zeeuw, 2010). The approach adopted in this paper is different: unlike an IEA
in which some of the countries cooperate, we consider a non-cooperative framework. Another line
of research has focused on the implications of investments in clean technology in a transboundary
4See Dutz & Sharma (2012), Popp (2011), World Bank (2010), Dechezleprêtre et al. (2011) and Dechezleprêtre et
al. (2013) for discussions.
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pollution control model (Van der Ploeg & de Zeeuw, 1994; Xepapedeas, 1995). Unlike us, these
papers consider technology transfers to be fixed and countries to be identical. Our contribution
relates more closely to Golombek & Hoel (2004), who show that for a given level of technology
spillovers, if a developed country starts caring more about the environment, it will increase both
its R&D expenditures and abatements. Depending on the slope of the benefits from aggregate
abatements, the developing country may in turn choose to decrease its abatements. Our approach
differs in the sense that we take preferences over the environment as given and let the technology
spillovers vary.
In our model, the possibility of spillovers decreasing the R&D investment comes from marginally
decreasing benefits from abatements. Hence, while building on a setting similar to Beccherle &
Tirole (2011) and Schmidt & Strausz (2014), we identify a novel effect because these papers as-
sume linear benefits. This paper also relates to a strand of the industrial organization literature
that considers the strategic dimension of investments. In particular, Fudenberg & Tirole (1984)
and Bulow et al. (1985) are two independent works that address the role of investments on ex post
firms’ behaviors in a non-cooperative framework. This paper shows how such strategic consider-
ations apply in a global public good provision game. Finally, we consider international spillovers,
as opposed to R&D spillovers between profit maximizing firms in a given country (as for instance
in Ulph and Ulph, 2007).
We present and solve the general model in Section 2. We introduce the alternative timing in
Section 3. We allow for cooperation in the first stage in Section 4. In Section 5, we provide more
intuition about our results by solving the game for two analytical functions. We discuss the policy
implications of our results and conclude in Section 6.
2 The model
The world is populated by two countries that play a 3-stage game. The two countries are asym-
metric in their technology endowment. Country 1 - the developed country - is the only one able to
choose to invest in a technology that lowers abatement costs.5 Country 2 - the developing country
- is able to capture the benefit of the investments made by country 1 through technology spillovers.
5In practice, this encompasses a number of policies in favor of public and private investment in clean technologies,
but we follow the standard specification that a country directly invests in a level of technology.
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Country 1 and country 2 have the following payoff functions:
pi1 = b(a1+a2)− c(a1,x)−αx (1)
pi2 = b(a1+a2)− c(a2,γx)−κγ (2)
where ai, i∈ {1,2} is the abatement of country i in the third stage, b(.) and c(.) are the benefit func-
tions of (common) abatements and the cost function of (private) abatements respectively. Clean
technology investments made by country 1 in the second stage are represented by x, provided
at constant linear cost α > 0. The parameter γ ∈ [0,1] accounts for the intensity of technology
transfers through technology spillovers between the developed and the developing country.6 The
degree of spillovers is determined by the level of absorptive capacities set by the country 2 in stage
1 at a constant linear cost κ > 0. We choose this timing in order to study the strategic effects of
technology spillovers on developed country’s investment in clean technology and ultimately on
each country’s welfare.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we make the following general assumptions:
b′ =
∂b
∂a
≥ 0 ; c′ = ∂c
∂a
≥ 0 ; ∂c
∂x
≤ 0 ; b′′ = ∂
2b
(∂a)2
< 0
c′′ =
∂ 2c
(∂a)2
> 0 ;
∂ 2c
∂a∂x
≤ 0 ; ∂
2c
∂x2
≥ 0
(3)
Benefit and cost functions are continuous and twice differentiable, marginal benefits of (global)
abatements are decreasing, marginal costs of (private) abatements are increasing and investments
lower the abatement costs. Furthermore, investments in clean technology also lower the marginal
costs of abatements. Finally, returns on investments in technology and absorptive capacities are
diminishing.
We look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria and solve the game by backward induction.
Hence, we start with the analysis of the third stage.
6We borrow this specification of imperfect spillovers from Spence (1984).
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2.1 Third stage
In this stage, country 1 and country 2 decide simultaneously how much abatement to provide. Best
responses of each country are given by:
a1(a2,x,γ) = argmax
a1
b(a1+a2)− c(a1,x) (4)
a2(a1,x,γ) = argmax
a2
b(a1+a2)− c(a2,γx) (5)
The choices of abatements are determined by a Nash equilibrium {a∗1(x,γ),a∗2(x,γ)}, which is
characterized by the following conditions:
b′ =
∂c(a1,x)
∂a1
(6)
b′ =
∂c(a2,γx)
∂a2
(7)
At equilibrium, as abatements are a global public good, equations (6) and (7) imply that
∂c(a1,x)/∂a1 = ∂c(a2,γx)/∂a2. As we have 0≤ γ ≤ 1, it must be that:
a∗1 ≥ a∗2. (8)
This result is the consequence of the fact that players are asymmetric in their abatement costs. The
most efficient player (the developed country) provides more abatements than the least efficient one
(the developing country).
Lemma 1 For every x, ∂a∗1/∂γ ≤ 0 while ∂a∗2/∂γ ≥ 0. However, ∂ (a∗1 +a∗2)/∂γ ≥ 0.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix.
The intuition underlying Lemma 1 is that, for a given level of technology investment x, an
increase in γ results in the two countries becoming more symmetric. Country 2, which initially
provides less abatement (equation (8)), provides more. Conversely, country 1 reduces its abate-
ment provision. Thus, all other things held constant, an increase in γ is also a transfer of abatements
from the most to the least efficient country. It generates a carbon leakage and the burden of climate
change mitigation is redistributed towards country 2. However, the net effect on the sum of abate-
ments is positive. Indeed, an increase in γ also implies a reduction in the overall abatement costs
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(i.e. abatement costs of country 1 are unchanged but abatement costs of country 2 are reduced).
Since it is cheaper to abate, aggregate abatements increase. In the special case of quadratic costs
that we further develop in Section 5, c(a1,x) = a21/2x and c(a2,γx) = a22/2γx, equations (6) and (7)
simplify to
b′ =
a1
x
=
a2
γx
. (9)
Hence, a∗2 = γa∗1.
2.2 Second stage
In the second stage of the game, country 1 determines the optimal investment x that both countries
will use in the third stage. Formally, country 1 faces the following maximization problem:
x∗ = argmax
x
b(a∗1+a
∗
2)− c(a∗1,x)−αx. (10)
Equilibrium investment x∗ is then determined by the first-order condition of this maximization
problem, which is given by:
b′
∂a∗2
∂x
− ∂c
∂x
−α = 0. (11)
Thus, a characterization of the Nash equilibrium of the subgame composed of the second and
the third stages is a set of strategies {x∗(γ),a∗1(x,γ),a∗2(x,γ)}.
Equation (11) shows that country 1 considers the effects of its own investments (in clean tech-
nology) on country 2. That is, in the presence of technology spillovers, investment has an indirect
effect as it changes country 2’s ex post abatements. This effect is described by ∂a∗2/∂x in equation
(11).
In general, the sign of this effect is ambiguous, as an increase in technology reduces costs for
country 2 but has an higher impact on the costs of country 1. However, in the special case of the
quadratic costs c(a1,x) = a21/2x and c(a2,γx) = a22/2γx, we can derive the following additional results.
Claim 1 With quadratic costs of abatement, for γ ∈ [0,1], ∂a∗1/∂x ≥ 0 and ∂a∗2/∂x ≥ 0. As a result,
∂ (a∗1 +a
∗
2)/∂x≥ 0.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix.
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Corollary 1 With quadratic costs of abatement, for γ ∈ [0,1], ∂a∗2/∂x= γ ∂a∗1/∂x. As a result, ∂a∗2/∂x≤
∂a∗1/∂x.
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix.
The response of x∗ to a change in γ is crucial to determine final payoffs. Country 2 anticipates
this reaction when determining its optimal level γ in stage 1. To help us understand this choice,
we now study in more details the strategic interaction between γ and x∗.
2.3 Increased technology spillovers: comparative statics
In this section, we carry out the analysis of the effects induced by an increase in technology
spillovers on abatements and payoffs at equilibrium. Such effects on ai, i ∈ {1,2} are formally
given by:
da∗i
dγ
=
∂a∗i
∂γ︸︷︷︸
Direct effect
+
∂a∗i
∂x
∂x∗
∂γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect effect
. (12)
We see that the total effect of an increase in γ on abatements is the sum of two distinct effects.
First, the direct effect on abatements described in Lemma 1. Second, the indirect effect through
investments x. We must now sign ∂x∗/∂γ, that is, country 1’s investments response to changes in
technology spillovers.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium investments by country 1 increase with technology spillovers whenever
the benefits from additional abatements generated by an improved technology are sufficiently high.
A necessary and sufficient condition is given by:
b′
∂ 2a∗2
∂x∂γ
≥−b′′ ∂a
∗
2
∂γ
(
∂a∗1
∂x
+
∂a∗2
∂x
)
(13)
Proof. Thanks to assumptions (3) and the implicit function theorem, ∂x∗/∂γ has the same sign as
∂ 2pi1/∂x∂γ. Therefore, we have that:
∂ 2pi1
∂x∂γ
= b′
∂ 2a∗2
∂x∂γ
+b′′
∂a∗2
∂γ
(
∂a∗1
∂x
+
∂a∗2
∂x
)
(14)
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The sign of equation (14) is ambiguous which implies that condition (13) might not be fulfilled.
The intuition underlying Proposition 1 is as follows. Provided that ∂ 2a∗2/∂x∂γ ≥ 0, when γ increases,
country 2 is more responsive to country 1’s investments. As a result, incentives for country 1 to
invest increase. This is illustrated by the first term of the right-hand side of equation (14). On the
other hand, for a given x, the additional abatements provided by country 2 have a lower marginal
value as marginal benefits of abatements are declining. Consequently, incentives for country 1 to
invest decrease. This is illustrated by the second term of the right-hand side of equation (14). The
sum of these two effects determines the reaction of x to an increase in γ .
Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that ∂ 2a∗2/∂x∂γ≥ 0,7 as the sign of this expression depends
on the third-derivatives of the benefit functions for which we make no specific assumptions. If
∂ 2a∗2/∂x∂γ ≤ 0, it follows directly that ∂ 2pi1/∂x∂γ ≤ 0 and country 1 decreases investments x∗ as γ
increases.
The decline in marginal benefits of abatements is crucial to understand the impact of an in-
crease in cross-country technology spillovers. High absolute values of b′′ tend to reduce the im-
pact of γ on the marginal benefit of technology investments in country 1. At a given equilibrium
in the subgame composed of the last two stages, if the next abatement has an arbitrarily low value
(that is, if b′′ is arbitrarily high in absolute value at that point), country 1 will reduce its technol-
ogy investments as a response to an increase in technology spillovers. The reason is that country
1’s investments response will accordingly attenuate or exacerbate the carbon leakage defined in
Lemma 1. In the special case of the quadratic costs studied in the examples, c(a1,x) = a21/2x and
c(a1,γx) = a22/2γx, and if ∂x∗/∂γ ≥ 0, from Lemma 1 and Claim 1, we have:
da∗1
dγ
=
∂a∗1
∂γ︸︷︷︸
≤0
+
∂a∗1
∂x
∂x∗
∂γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(15)
and we see that the indirect effect of increased investments limits the direct adverse reaction of
country 1’s abatements to an increase in technology spillovers. In contrast, by decreasing its
investments, country 1 exacerbates carbon leakage. In doing so, country 1 chooses a world with
7In the examples we provide, this condition however always holds.
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less additional abatement provided by country 2, but with more free riding. To see this, note that:
da∗1
dγ
− da
∗
2
dγ
=
(
∂a∗1
∂γ
− ∂a
∗
2
∂γ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+
(
∂a∗1
∂x
− ∂a
∗
2
∂x
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
∂x∗
∂γ
(16)
from Lemma 1 and Corollary 1. As γ increases, the difference between country 1 and country 2’s
abatements decreases even further if ∂x∗/∂γ ≤ 0.
Thus, as cross-country spillovers increase, country 1 observes that country 2 is more able to
abate. One would expect rising γ to increase investments in country 1 as they can now increasingly
benefit country 2. This is only true if the marginal benefits of these additional abatements are high
enough. Otherwise, country 1 takes the increased capability of country 2 as an opportunity to shift
the burden of climate change mitigation instead of providing it with further incentives to abate. As
its capacity to abate increases, country 2 might be left with a more difficult challenge.
Finally, we can characterize the welfare implications of an increase in cross-county technology
spillovers.
Proposition 2 At equilibrium, an increase in technology spillovers makes country 1 better off.
Country 2 is better off with marginally higher technology spillovers if and only if:
∂b
∂a
da∗1
dγ
≥ ∂c
∂γ
+
∂c
∂x
∂x∗
∂γ
(17)
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix
The intuition underlying Proposition 2 is that country 1 is better off with an increase in tech-
nology spillovers as it can now free ride on the additional abatements provided by country 2. The
effect on the payoff of country 2 is ambiguous. Country 2 observes a direct effect of decreasing
abatements of country 1 (the carbon leakage). However, as equation (15) shows, this adverse effect
is attenuated if country 1 increases investment in response to an increase in technology spillovers.
In this case, country 2 can enjoy a reduction in abatement costs thanks to the additional technology
provided by country 1. Thus, the sign of the left-hand side of equation (17) is ambiguous as the
sign of da∗1/dγ is ambiguous. The first term on the right-hand side is clearly negative, as the direct
impact of spillovers is to decrease costs. The sign of the second term is however also ambiguous.
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While the effect of a better technology is to decrease the costs (∂c/∂x < 0), the effect of spillovers
can be either to increase or decrease the equilibrium investment in technology (as shown in Propo-
sition 1). This also implies that if country 1 could commit to a certain level of investment in R&D
after the enhancement of absorptive capacities take place, country 2 would always be better off
when technology spillovers increase. If such a commitment were possible and credible, most of
the problems documented in the present paper would be mitigated.
Hoel (1991) and Golombek & Hoel (2004) show that with marginally decreasing benefits from
abatements, one country caring more about the environment may induce the other one to abate less
in equilibrium. In their paper, an increase in the environmental sensibility of a developed country
always increases the investment in technology, as this country directly benefits from the investment
for the additional abatements that it provides. Our case is different. Instead of measuring the
impact of a change in preferences, we measure the impact of a change in the level of spillovers.
If spillovers increase, the developed country has the opportunity to impose more of the climate
change mitigation burden on the developing country. As Propositions 1 and 2 show, this might
result in lower investment in technology by the developed country, and a net loss for the developing
country.
2.4 First stage
In the first stage, the developing country 2 chooses the level of its absorptive capacities before tech-
nology investment by the developed country 1. As the developed country makes all its technology
available, absorptive capacities are equal to the level of spillovers γ . There is a positive marginal
cost κ to enhance absorptive capacities. The equilibrium level of absorptive capacities in the first
stage directly follows from Proposition 2, by comparing the (possibly negative) marginal impact
of increased spillovers on the payoffs of country 2 and the marginal cost of enhancing absorptive
capacities.
Proposition 3 The subgame perfect level of absorptive capacities is given by γ∗, and solves
κ =
∂b
∂a
da∗1
dγ
− ∂c
∂γ
+
∂c
∂x
∂x∗
∂γ
, (18)
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if there exists an interior solution γ ∈ (0,1) to the first stage maximization problem of the de-
veloping country 2. Else, γ∗ = 0 if κ > ∂b∂a
da∗1
dγ − ∂c∂γ + ∂c∂x ∂x
∗
∂γ , ∀γ ∈ (0,1) and γ∗ = 1 if κ <
∂b
∂a
da∗1
dγ − ∂c∂γ + ∂c∂x ∂x
∗
∂γ , ∀γ ∈ (0,1) .
Proof. The proof follows directly from condition (17). If there exists an interior solution the
developing country enhances its absorptive capacities up to the point where its marginal benefit
(the right-hand side of equation (18)) equates the marginal cost κ .
This proposition shows that the reason for which a developing country does not enhance ab-
sorptive capacities is not necessarily that the cost κ is too high, but that the strategic consequences
are not always positive. Hence, trying to design monetary transfers between developed and de-
veloping countries based on κ alone might misestimate the total costs, that include the possibly
adverse effect from the strategic behaviour of the developed country.
3 Alternative timing
Consider now an alternative timing, where technology is chosen first and enhancement of absorp-
tive capacities afterwards. In the third stage, country 1 and country 2 decide simultaneously how
much abatement to provide. As before, the equilibrium level of abatements in this last stage is
characterized by b′ = ∂c(a1,x)∂a1 =
∂c(a2,γx)
∂a2 .
In the second stage, the developing country 2 chooses the level of its absorptive capacities
given the technology investment by the developed country 1. The subgame perfect level of ab-
sorptive capacities is given by γ∗, and solves
κ =
∂b
∂a
da∗1
dγ
− ∂c
∂γ
, (19)
if there exists an interior solution γ ∈ (0,1) to the second stage maximization problem of the
developing country 2. Else, γ∗ = 0 if κ > ∂b∂a
da∗1
dγ − ∂c∂γ + ∂c∂x ∂x
∗
∂γ , ∀γ ∈ (0,1) and γ∗ = 1 if κ <
∂b
∂a
da∗1
dγ − ∂c∂γ + ∂c∂x ∂x
∗
∂γ , ∀γ ∈ (0,1) .
If there exists an interior solution the developing country enhances its absorptive capacities up
to the point where its marginal benefit (the right-hand side of equation (19)) equates the marginal
cost κ .
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In this timing, the enhancement of absorptive capacities is not influenced anymore by the
anticipated level of technology offered by the developed country 1. The first element of the right-
hand side of (19) is negative (higher spillovers decrease the abatement of country 1), while the
second is positive (higher spillovers decrease the costs). As compared to the timing outlined in
Section 2, there are fewer incentives to invest for the developing country, unless the impact of
higher spillovers was to decrease investment in technology by the developed country.
In the first stage, country 1 determines the optimal investment x that both countries will use
in the third stage. It is the solution to the first-order condition of this country’s maximization
problem, which is given by:
b′(
∂a∗2
∂x
+
∂a∗2
∂γ
∂γ
∂x
)− ∂c
∂x
−α = 0 (20)
The difference with the previous timing is that this time the developed country 1 anticipates
the impact of its investment on the enhancement of absorptive capacities of the developing country
in period 2. The strategic effect can be disentangled in two parts. First, the developed country may
be reluctant to invest in technology if it expects the developing country to react by choosing a low
γ . Second the developed country may invest more to compensate for the fact that the developing
country will not enhance its absorptive capacities. We come back to this timing in the simulations
in Section 5.
4 Nash bargaining over absorptive capacities
As discussed in the introduction, joint implementation of technology transfers is largely promoted
by international institutions. It is therefore natural to think of enhancement of absorptive capacities
as being the result of a cooperation between developed and developing countries in the first stage.
We assume that countries need to reach an agreement in order to share the gains generated by an
increase in technology spillovers. This case is therefore in deliberate contrast to the one presented
in the previous Section, where absorptive capacities enhancement was chosen unilaterally by the
developing country. We model this process as a Nash bargaining that takes place among countries
in the first stage in order to decide on the level of technology spillovers to be implemented and the
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associated monetary transfers T (γ) so that (4) and (5) become
pi1 = b(a1+a2)− c(a1,x)−αx−T (γ) (21)
pi2 = b(a1+a2)− c(a2,γx)−κγ+T (γ) (22)
As we allow for all possible monetary transfers, spillovers are chosen cooperatively in order to
maximize joint surplus in the first period, solving by backward induction for the impact of γ on x∗
and a∗. Using (21) and (22), if there exists an interior solution, the cooperative level of spillovers
γˆ solves
κ =
∂b
∂a
(
da∗1
dγ
+
∂a∗2
∂γ
)− ∂c
∂γ
+
∂c
∂x
∂x∗
∂γ
. (23)
Comparing (23) and (18), it is straightforward that γˆ ≥ γ∗, as when the level of absorptive
capacities is decided cooperatively the benefits on the developed country 1 are internalized. As in
Proposition 2, corner solutions γˆ ∈ {0,1} exist if no value of γ satisfies (23). We define bargaining
over technology spillovers as follows:
The outcome of a Nash bargaining over the gains generated by an increase in technology
spillovers is a pair (γˆ,T ), with γˆ defined in (23) if it is not a corner solution, and T the (possibly
negative) monetary transfers from the developed to the developing country. As any technology
spillover is the consequence of an agreement between countries, we assume the disagreement
point to be γ = 0. We assume the bargaining power of developed and developing countries to be
(1−β ) and β respectively. 8
Proposition 4 Under Nash bargaining over the level of absorptive capacities, a level of spillovers
γˆ is implemented with a monetary transfer T that solves,
T (γˆ) = β
∫ γˆ
0
∂b
∂a
∂a∗2
∂γ
dγ− (1−β )
∫ γˆ
0
(
∂b
∂a
da∗1
dγ
− ∂c
∂x
∂x∗
∂γ
− ∂c
∂γ
− ∂κ
∂γ
)dγ. (24)
Proof. See mathematical appendix.
8For a Nash bargaining solution to be implementable, the enhancement of absorptive capacities must be contractible.
Else, the developing country could perfectly accept a transfer T to increase spillovers and not improve absorptive
capacities if it decreases its surplus.
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As for the previous results, the equilibrium transfers depend on the curvature of the benefit
curve. Equation (24) can be disentangled in two parts. First, the direct effect of spillovers: pro-
vided that β is sufficiently high, an increase in γ increases the monetary transfer T simply because
the surplus increases more for the developed country 1. However, for a given level of technology
x, marginal transfers are decreasing with γ , as benefits from abatements are also marginally de-
creasing. Second, the indirect effect: an increase in γ affects the investment in technology. For
this second effect, an increase in x acts as a substitute for monetary transfers, because it allows
country 2 to receive a higher share of the total surplus before any transfer. Thus, as the marginal
benefit curve is decreasing when abatements increase, the impact of γ on investment in technology
decreases with γ .
The bargaining over γ only aims at providing a rationale for the actual monetary transfers
described in the introduction. To see how efficient this bargaining is, one could also consider
a more cooperative solution in which both x and γ are jointly chosen by country 1 and 2. The
outcome of this negotiation is characterized by
(xˆ, γˆ) = argmax
x,γ
2b(a∗1+a
∗
2)− c(a∗1,x)− c(a∗2,γx)−αx−κγ. (25)
It is possible to show (see also the simulations in the next section) that, while it always increases
aggregate welfare, cooperation on both γ and x may lead to a lower level of absorptive capacities
than cooperation on γ only. The reason is that, when countries bargain on γ alone, a high level of
spillovers can be used in order to provide incentives for higher investment in technology, some-
thing that is not be necessary if technology is also chosen cooperatively.
Similarly, it is possible to solve the model for a bargaining over all variables of interest,
(xˆ, γˆ, aˆ1, aˆ2) = arg max
x,γ,a1,a2
2b(a∗1+a
∗
2)− c(a∗1,x)− c(a∗2,γx)−αx−κγ. (26)
Again, more cooperation always increases aggregate welfare. However, full cooperation may
also yield lower investment both in x and γ . It is because the cooperative investment in technol-
ogy and spillovers in the absence of cooperation on abatements can be used as a way to provide
incentives for future abatements.
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In the next section, we illustrate the results in Propositions 3 and 4 with cost and benefit
functions that lead to the different strategic effects studied in Propositions 1 and 2. We use the
(numerical) solutions characterized by equations (25) (denoted as “bargaining over x and γ”) and
(26) (denoted as “fully cooperative”) as a benchmark to compare the non-cooperative and semi-
cooperative scenarios found above.
5 Simulations
In this section, we use analytical payoff functions in order to illustrate the main intuitions of the
paper. To simplify the computations, we assume that in the case of Nash bargaining both countries
have equal bargaining power. Therefore, equation (24) rewrites
T (γˆ) =
1
2
∫ γˆ
0
[
∂b
∂a
(
∂a2
∂γ
− da1
dγ
)+
∂c
∂x
∂x∗
∂γ
+
∂c
∂γ
+
∂κ
∂γ
]dγ. (27)
[INSERT FIGURES 1 and 2 about here]
We use two different benefit functions (see Figures 1 and 2):
bl =−(2−a1−a2)
2
2
(28)
bh =−(2−a1−a2)2 (29)
The first one, bl , represents a case where marginal benefits from abatements decrease slowly,
so that technology and absorptive capacities act as complements. Hence, the abatements of country
1 are relatively inelastic to those of country 2 and higher spillovers induce higher investment in
technology. The second, bh, represents a case where marginal benefits decrease quickly, so that
technology and spillovers act as substitutes, the abatements of country 1 are relatively elastic
to those of country 2 and higher investment in absorptive capacities induce lower investment in
technology. In the terms of equation (13), we see that for a given b′, −b′′ is higher with benefit
function bh.
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Cost functions for country 1 and country 2 are respectively given by:
c1 =
a21
2x
(30)
c2 =
a22
2γx
(31)
where ai ≥ 0 is the level of abatement of country i ∈ {1,2}, and x ≥ 0 is the level of investment
chosen by country 1. We also assume the marginal cost of investment in technology to be α = 1.
[INSERT FIGURES 3, 4 and 5 about here]
Figure 3 plots the respective equilibrium payoffs and technology levels when the two countries
have bl as a benefit function.9 In this example, the equilibrium level of technology x increases for
most values of γ . The marginal impact of spillovers on payoffs and the bargaining solutions are
plotted in Figure 4. The initial increase in technology benefits country 2 more than the marginal
cost of enhancing absorptive technologies, so that for low values of γ , dpi∗2 > κ and γ∗ ≈ 0.29 has
an interior solution. The bargained level has also an interior solution γˆ ≈ 0.63.
In the alternative timing described in Section 3, the second stage absorptive capacities is γ = 0,
for all values of x. As technology and spillovers are complement, this timing also induces the
lowest investment in technology (Figure 3).
Figure 5 shows the result of the bargaining over both x and γ . The optimal level of spillovers
is given by the intersection of κ and dpi∗1 + dpi∗2 . The difference with Figure 4 is that is that the
payoffs now capture the reaction of the optimal x described in (25). As compared to both the
non-cooperative bargaining and the bargaining over γ only, the investment in technology is higher.
The optimal level of spillovers is however lower than the result of the bargaining over γ only. The
reason is again the complementarity between technology and spillovers. When bargaining is over
γ only, a socially too high γ is used as a commitment to induce a level of x that is closer to the
optimal one.
We report the equilibrium values of x and γ under no cooperation, for the bargaining over γ
only, and for the bargaining over both x and γ in Table 1. We also report these values for the fully
9The equilibrium abatements in the second stage are given by a∗1 =
2x
1+(1+γ)x and a
∗
2 = γ
2x
1+(1+γ)x . The equilibrium
level of absorptive capacities in the first stage is the solution to x∗ = argmaxx− (2−a
∗
1−a∗2)2
2 −
(a∗1)
2
2x − x.
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cooperative game. Following the same logic, we observe that, while a is higher, a full cooperation
(including abatements) leads to values of both x and γ that are lower compared to a bargaining
over x and γ only. In the latter case, x and γ are used to induce higher a1 and a2, something that
is not necessary when abatements are chosen cooperatively. Unsurprisingly, aggregate welfare is
always higher when there is more cooperation.
[INSERT Table 1 about here]
[INSERT FIGURES 6, 7 and 8 about here]
Figure 6 plots the equilibrium payoffs and technology levels when the two countries have bh
as a benefit function.10 In this case, spillovers decrease the level of technology for all values of γ .
The marginal impact of spillovers on payoffs and the bargaining solutions are plotted in Figure 7.
Both effects identified in Proposition 4 go in the same direction. The initial increase in technology
spillovers provokes a decrease in technology investments, which makes country 2 worse-off, so
that there is no value of κ such that γ∗ has an interior solution. The bargained level has an interior
solution γˆ ≈ 0.77, with transfers T (γˆ) higher than the cost of enhancing absorptive capacities κγˆ .
In the alternative timing, country 2 would again choose not to enhance at all its absorptive
capacities γ = 0 for all x. Therefore, the first period level of investment x would be the same as in
the timing described in Section 2. This is a case where spillovers and technology are substitutes:
the developed country 1 compensates for the lower absorptive capacities of country 2.
As for the previous function, we compare in Figure 8 the above result to the one of the bar-
gaining on x and γ . We see that both the bargained levels of spillovers γ and of technology x are
slightly higher than the ones resulting from a bargaining over γ only. The reason is that, because of
the higher slope of b′, over-investing in absorptive capacities to convince the developed country 1
to invest more in technology has little impact. The fully cooperative levels of x and γ are however
slightly lower than the result of a bargaining over γ and x only, for reasons similar to the previous
example. We report the values of x and γ in the different cases in Table 2.
[INSERT Table 2 about here]
10The equilibrium abatements in the second stage are given by a∗1 =
4x
1+(1+γ)2x and a
∗
2 = γ
4x
1+(1+γ)2x . The equilibrium
level of absorptive capacities in the first stage is the solution to x∗ = argmaxx−(2−a∗1−a∗2)2− (a
∗
1)
2
2x − x.
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6 Discussion and conclusion
In most recent climate negotiations, an important topic is the transfer of technologies from devel-
oped to developing countries. Within a non-cooperative framework, we show that the strategic
response of technology investments in developed countries can jeopardise the effect of an increase
in technology spillovers on climate change mitigation.
The most problematic case corresponds to steep marginal benefit curves. In that case, an
enhancement in absorptive capacities may decrease investment in technology. Partial coopera-
tion over technology transfers may thus induce a lower technology investment than the fully non-
cooperative one. Bargaining over the surplus of cooperation therefore implies monetary transfers
from developed to developing countries, on top of the transfers of technology. Similar strategic
incentives arise if we consider the symmetric problem of developed countries investing in technol-
ogy taking into account future technology transfers, that we develop in our alternative timing. If
the marginal benefits from additional abatements are steep, investment in technology may decrease
incentives to invest in absorptive capacities. If one were to consider international agreements not
on technology transfers, but on investment in technology by developed countries, such incentives
would also have to be taken into account. A developed country would have to be compensated not
only for the cost of higher investments, but also for the possible decrease in absorptive capacities
induced by a higher investment in technology.
These adverse effects are attenuated if investment in climate sound technology increases with
technology spillovers. This type of response limits the carbon leakage induced by an improvement
in developing countries’ absorptive capacities and thus alleviates the potential negative effect on
developing countries’ welfare. It is therefore crucial to understand whether an increase in technol-
ogy spillovers leads to a rise in clean technology investments. Predicting technological adjustment
in developed countries requires estimating the curvature of their benefit function, a tricky and dif-
ficult empirical work. This may be done through surveys on the (marginal) willingness-to-pay for
CO2 abatements, but the incentives for truthful reporting would obviously be low. These predic-
tions also depend on two particular elements. First, the scientific results on the expected costs of
temperature increases. In particular, as the consensus of climate experts moves towards the idea
of tipping points, we can expect the marginal benefits of abatements to have a very steep slope
around these thresholds. Second, how countries actually value these (future) benefits. Part of it
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is the discount factor applied on future losses. Another one is the value of life under ambiguity
aversion (Treich, 2010).
Quite unsurprisingly, we find that more cooperation is always better. One reason is that it
allows achieving higher levels of aggregate abatements. A second one is that simultaneous co-
operation on several dimensions allows choosing the most efficient level of investment. When
only one or two dimensions are chosen cooperatively, the level of investment also reflects strategic
considerations. Because negotiations are currently made on technology transfers (and subsequent
agreements being enforced on these), understanding the incentives they create is crucial.
Another implication of this paper is that even if socially desirable, technology transfers may
be difficult to implement in practice when the benefits of such a process are not clearly deter-
mined. Before cutting a deal, countries must identify the actual gains of each player. If technology
investments in developed countries positively respond to an increase in cross-country spillovers,
additional monetary transfers are low and technology transfers could even be bought at a strictly
positive price by developing countries. However, if the adverse carbon leakage effect is not suffi-
ciently attenuated by technology investment response, developed countries will disproportionately
gain from a rise in spillovers and the latter should come with substantial monetary transfers to de-
veloping countries. Without sufficient (symmetric) information on the shape of the benefit curve,
countries may be reluctant to accept a deal if they fear to be worse off or more generally, to be
exploited by receiving only a small share of the increased aggregate welfare generated by a rise in
technology spillovers. Additionally, developed countries may fear to be ripped off by paying for
technology transfers to countries that have little interest in implementing them.
The finding that monetary transfers resulting from a bargaining over the additional joint surplus
from cooperation could go in both directions is in line with Buob and Stephan (2013). They find
that developed countries should finance adaptation in poor countries to the extent that they benefit
from it. Both papers point that developed countries have weak incentives to provide funding
in a non-cooperative framework, which highlights the importance of a compelling international
agreement. As of today, it is still not clear what provisions of the Paris agreement are legally
binding and the latter might fail to provide incentives strong enough for countries to deliver on
their promises.
Finally, unlike the idea that developed countries make double efforts by abating and providing
technology, this model shows that providing clean technologies is good for rich countries. While
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this is true for a country as an entity, it clearly raises an issue regarding incentives for firms to
innovate without substantial research subsidies. In particular, firms in developed countries should
have incentives to make frontier innovations trickling down to developing countries. Such innova-
tion policies include funding for research with a focus on the environment to the extent that such
R&D is the interest of the country as a whole.
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7 Figures and tables
0
bl
bh
−2
b(a1+a2)
0 2
a1+a2
Figure 1: Two examples on the impact of technology spillovers (benefit functions)
0
b′l
b′h
4
b′(a1+a2)
2
a1+a2
Figure 2: Two examples on the impact of technology spillovers (marginal benefit)
Table 1: Results with benefit curve bl
x γ a1 a2 a pi1+pi2
No bargaining .47 .14 .61 .08 .69 -2.69
Bargaining on γ .50 .87 .52 .47 .99 -2.50
Bargaining on x and γ .86 .73 .69 .51 1.20 -2.35
Fully cooperative .80 .61 .76 .61 1.34 -2.26
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Figure 3: Equilibrium payoffs and technology investment, case 1
Figure 4: Equilibrium transfers when spillovers increase investment in technology
Figure 5: “Complete” bargaining over both x and γ
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Figure 6: Equilibrium payoffs and technology investment, case 2
Figure 7: Equilibrium transfers when spillovers decrease investment in technology
Figure 8: “Complete” bargaining over both x and γ
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Table 2: Results with benefit curve bh
x γ a1 a2 a pi1+pi2
No bargaining .91 0 1.29 0 1.29 -2.84
Bargaining on γ .66 .87 .76 .66 1.42 -2.58
Bargaining on x and γ .96 .92 .82 .75 1.57 -2.46
Fully cooperative .91 .82 .95 .78 1.73 -2.37
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
In this proof, we analyze the second stage subgame. From equations (6) and (7), we can derive the
slopes of the best-responses a1(a2,x,γ) and a2(a1,x,γ):
da1
da2
=
da2
da1
=
−b′′
(b′′− c′′) ∈ (−1,0) (32)
As a result, the game has a unique and stable equilibrium.
Next, if we assume that x is held constant, then we have that:
∂ 2pi2
∂a2∂γ
=− ∂
2c
∂a2∂γ
≥ 0 (33)
It follows that pi2 displays increasing differences in (a2,γ).
An increase in γ induces a positive shift in player 2’s best response a2(a1,x,γ). As the best
responses a1(a2,x,γ) and a2(a1,x,γ) both have a slope belonging to (−1,0), the subsequent de-
crease in a∗1 is less than proportional to the increase in a
∗
2. As a result, we have that (a
∗
1+a
∗
2) must
increase with γ . It follows that ∂a∗2/∂γ ≥ 0 and ∂a∗1/∂γ ≤ 0 and ∂ (a∗1 +a∗2)/∂γ ≥ 0.
A.2 Proof of Claim 1
Thanks to the Implicit Function Theorem, we have that
 ∂a∗1∂x
∂a∗2
∂x
=− 1
( 1γx +
1
x )b
′′− 1γx 1x
 b′′− 1γx −b′′
−b′′ b′′− 1x
 −a∗1x2
− a∗2γx2
 (34)
As a result, we have:
∂a∗1
∂x
=
−a∗1x2 1γx
( 1γx +
1
x )b
′′− 1γx 1x
≥ 0 (35)
∂a∗2
∂x
=
− a∗2γx2 1x
( 1γx +
1
x )b
′′− 1γx 1x
≥ 0 (36)
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A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
From equation (8), we know that a∗2 = γa∗1. Replacing this value in equation (36) in the proof of
Lemma 1, it follows directly that
∂a∗2
∂x
= γ
∂a∗1
∂x
≤ ∂a
∗
1
∂x
(37)
for γ ∈ [0,1].
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
For an increase in γ , the total effect on payoff of country 1 is given by:
dpi1
dγ
=
∂b
∂a
da∗1
dγ
+
∂b
∂a
da∗2
dγ
− ∂c
∂a1
da∗1
dγ
− ∂c
∂x
∂x∗1
∂γ
−α ∂x
∗
1
∂γ
=
∂b
∂a
(
∂a∗2
∂x
∂x∗
∂γ
+
∂a∗2
∂γ
)
− ∂c
∂x
∂x∗
∂γ
−α ∂x
∗
∂γ
=
∂b
∂a
∂a∗2
∂γ
+
(
∂b
∂a
∂a∗2
∂x
− ∂c
∂x
−α
)
∂x∗
∂γ
=
∂b
∂a
∂a∗2
∂γ
(38)
as at equilibrium,
(
∂b
∂a
∂a∗2
∂x − ∂c∂x −α
)
= 0 (see condition (11)). The sign of equation (38) is clearly
positive as ∂b/∂a≥ 0 by assumption and ∂a∗2/∂γ ≥ 0 thanks to Lemma 1.
For an increase in γ , the total effect on payoff of country 2 is given by:
dpi2
dγ
=
∂b
∂a
da∗1
dγ
+
∂b
∂a
da∗2
dγ
− ∂c
∂a2
da∗2
dγ
− ∂c
∂x
∂x∗
∂γ
− ∂c
∂γ
=
∂b
∂a
da∗1
dγ
− ∂c
∂x
∂x∗
∂γ
− ∂c
∂γ
(39)
thanks to the envelop theorem. We have ∂b/∂a > 0, ∂c/∂x < 0 and ∂c/∂γ < 0 by assumption. However,
we have that ∂x∗/∂γ and da∗1/dγ are ambiguous by Proposition 1. It follows that the sign of equation
(39) is ambiguous.
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
A Nash bargaining with bargaining power β to the developing country 2 implies a transfer from
country 1 to country 2 equal to the difference between a share β of the additional surplus generated
by the technology spillovers and the additional surplus obtained by country 2. As we assume
spillovers are the consequence of an agreement, the disagreement point corresponds to the payoffs
if γ = 0. This is, using (38) and (39) and adding the enhancement of absorptive capacities κ ,
T (γ) = β [(pi1(γˆ)−pi1(γ = 0))+(pi2(γˆ)−pi2(γ = 0))]− (pi2(γˆ)−pi2(γ = 0))
= β
∫ γˆ
0
(
dpi1
dγ
+
dpi2
dγ
)dγ−
∫ γˆ
0
dpi2
dγ
dγ
= β
∫ γˆ
0
∂b
∂a
∂a∗2
∂γ
dγ− (1−β )
∫ γˆ
0
(
∂b
∂a
da∗1
dγ
− ∂c
∂x
∂x∗
∂γ
− ∂c
∂γ
− ∂κ
∂γ
)dγ. (40)
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